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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANDY VERCIMAK, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ADAM OSTOICH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIE·F 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7295 
Plaintiff commenced this action against the defend-
ant, who is his uncle (Tr. p. 55) to recover $500.00 for 
labor in connection with the construction and remodeling 
of certain premises known as the Horseshoe Inn at 4136 
South State Street, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and for the sum of $7,500.00, alleging the same to be 
one-half the reasonable value of the business of said 
parties, and for an accounting (Tr. p. 9). 
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It is alleged in plaintiff's first amended complaint 
that on or about November 1, 1947 plaintiff and defendant 
entered into an agreement of partnership for the opera-
ting and conducting of a business at said Horseshoe 
Inn, and that under the terms thereof defendant agreed 
to furnish the real property and building premises 
necessary, together with all fixtures and equipment and 
that plaintiff should contribute $100.00 a month during 
the term of said partnership; that the if)artners own an 
equal interest therein and were to share alike in the 
profits and management of said business; that on the 
12th day of February, 1948 defendant told plaintiff that 
the partnership was at an end and not to come upon 
the premises. It is further alleged that the defendant, 
because he would not enter into a written memorandum 
or partnership agreement, and because of the conduct 
above mentioned, had breached the partnership agree-
ment; that defendant refused to settle with him for the 
profits· and for damage resulting to the plaintiff by de-
fendant's breach of the partnership agreement, except 
that the defendant paid to plaintiff plaintiff's share of 
the profits earned from said business to and including 
the 12th day of February, 1948 in the sum of $318.79. 
Defendant, in his answer, admitted that he refused 
to sign a written partnership agreement, but denied the 
other allegations in plaintiff's complaint and further 
alleged that prior to December 13, 1947 it was orally 
agreed between the parties that they would conduct a 
retail business for the sale of beer and other merchan-
dise incident to said business, and that they each would 
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3 
contribute $500.00 to the business and that in addition 
thereto the defendant would furnish the premises, fur-
nishings and fixtures necessary. He alleges that plain-
tiff violated the conditions of the oral agreement and 
failed to devote his time and energy to the business. 
Defendant further alleges that he had expended large 
sums of money for the benefit of the business, which 
had not been repaid to him, and that on the 12th day of 
February, 1948 it was agreed behYeen the parties to 
discontinue the business, and that at the request of 
plaintiff the inventory of stock and merchandise on hand 
was made and plaintiff was paid one-half the value 
thereof, together with one-half the amount due and 
owing plaintiff as his share of the business, which was 
done (Tr. pp. 1:2-13). The affirmative allegations of 
the answer were put in issue by plaintiff's reply (Tr. 
pp. 15-16). 
At the pre-trial the parties agreed that they entered 
h .. to a partnership on or about November 1, 1947 for 
the purpose of operating the Horseshoe Inn at 4136 
South State Street, Salt Lake County, Utah, and that 
each contributed the sum of $250.00 as an initial invest-
ment for said partnership; that they ceased operating 
as a partnership February 12, 1948 and the defendant 
paid to plaintiff the sum of $235.18, the plaintiff's share 
of the inventory of said business as of that date, and 
paid to plaintiff at least one-half of the profits on said 
business up to February 12, 1948, being the sum of 
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$477.13. The court then stated the disputed issues as 
follows: 
'' 1. Was there a 'complete settlement of accounts 
between the •parties on or about February 
12, 1948~ 
2. If not, what was the reasonable value of the 
business as of that date~" (Tr. p. 221). 
As heretofore stated, plaintiff is a nephew of de-
fendant, who formerly resided in Rock Springs, Wyo-
ming. Sometime in the fall of 1947 the defendant asked 
plaintiff if he would like to go in business with him and 
operate a beer tavern, if he could get a license to sell 
beer. He replied that he would not want to hazard the 
undertaking for a short period but if he could be assured 
of at least five years he would be interested (Tr. p. 64). 
He also suggested going into the grocery business but 
defendant told him he would not be interested in that 
(Tr. V· 65). In regard to the terms of the partnership 
the plaintiff stated: 
"Q. Well, now what were the terms of, accord-
ing to your conversation? 
A. Well, the terms was, we was to-we was to 
work equal, put in equal time in the place, 
and we was to pay equal share of the ex-
pense, and I was to furnish a hundred dol-
lars to offset his furnishings and building. 
Q. And how were you to divide profits~ 
A. Equally. 
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Q. And expenses? 
A. Equally." (Tr. pp. 66-67). 
Plaintiff testified, after the termination of the part-
nership and he had been paid his half of the inventory 
and profits of the business on February 17, 1948, that 
the following took place : 
''A. Well, he asked me how much more he owed 
me. I says, 'Mr. Ostoich,' I says, 'it isn't 
less than $3,000.' 
Q. Then what took place~ 
A. Well, when I told him that, he just thumbed 
his nose at me, and that is all there was to 
it." (Tr. p. 70). 
The receipts showing the payment for the inventory 
and profits were marked, introduced and received in 
evidence as Exhibits 1 and 2 respectively (Tr. p. 56). 
In January, 1948 plaintiff had his attorney prepare 
a proposed partnership agreement (Tr. p. 78), which 
was marked Exhibit 3 and admitted in evidence (Tr. p. 
81). Plaintiff claims the $3,000.00 for his portion of 
the good will of the business (Tr. p. 85). 
Concerning the formation of the partnership, the 
h rms of the agreement, the termination thereof and the 
cause therefor, and the settlement between the parties, 
the defendant testified that he had lived in Utah for 24 
years and in Salt Lake County for ten (Tr. p. 89). He 
and the plaintiff started operating the Horseshoe Inn 
sometime around the first of December, 1947. The ar-
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rangement was that they would share the cost and 
profits alike. Defendant owned the furniture, fixtures 
and premises, which were never turned over to the part-
nership nor was a lease given on the premises (Tr. p. 
90). The only money paid by the partners to the part-
nership was $250.00 by each of them about the 12th day 
of January, 1948 (Tr. p. 91). On the 12th day of Febru-
ary, 1948 he told plaintiff that the partnership was to 
be dissolved ('Tr. p. 91). There were several reasons 
why defendant wanted to terminate the partnership. 
Plaintiff had been drinking during working hours (Tr. 
p. 95) and at numerous times demanded that they tear 
out the apartment where defendant and his wife lived 
and make it into a dance hall ( Tr. p. 96). 
Defendant testified that on the 17th of February 
when the accounts were settled plain tiff knew he was 
getting more money than he was entitled to and was 
anxious to sign the recei1pts and accept the money. It 
was after plaintiff had signed the receipts that he de-
manded as damages the sum of $3,000.00. Plaintiff did 
not say what his damages were (Tr. p. 94), and when 
the witness paid the money on the inventory and profits 
he thought the entire matter was settled (Tr. p. 96). On 
cross examination defendant testified that when he pre-
pared the receipts he thought that he had made a final 
settlement (Tr. p. 106). 
Mrs. Ostoich testified that when the settlement was 
made that her husband, plaintiff and his wife, were 
present, and that the following conversation took place: 
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"Q. Did you hear your husband ask :Mr. Verci-
mak if he owed him any more money~ 
A. He asked, he said, 'Andy,' he said, 'it is 
okeh, now, I pay you out~' He said, 'Yes, 
it is okeh,' and, when he said that, I turned 
around and to my niece, I said, 'Dancel, we 
owe you anything more~' She said, 'No, 
you don't owe me nothing. ' I said, 'Thank 
you; I am glad we don't. It is all right.' 
(Tr. p. 108). 
She also testified concerning the plaintiff drinking 
about the premises. ~frs. V ercimak denied that she had 
made the statement that they owed nothing to them and 
stated that her husband never drank (Tr. p. 112). 
In relation to the attempted iproof of the value of 
the business or the value of .good will, J·osephine Bowen 
testified she was a housewife ( Tr. p. 121) and had visited 
the Horseshoe Inn occasionally (Tr. p. 122); that the 
business seemed to be a thriving business ( Tr. p. 123) ; 
that when she visited there in the evening there were 
from five to twenty-five people present (Tr. p. 127). 
Plaintiff contended that the net profit per month was 
$750.00 (Tr. p. 130), however, upon cross examination, 
he admitted that the profit for the month of December 
was only $380.00 ( Tr. p. 140). In figuring the income 
he took into consideration the money derived from pin-
ball games and the punch boards ( Tr. 'P· 143). 
John B. Fairbanks, who was in the novelty business 
of selling punch boards, pinball games and slot machines 
during December, 1947 and January, 1948, stated that 
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he visited the Horseshoe Inn many times; that around 
New Year's Eve or sometime during the holidays there 
was quite a crowd but at other times there were only 4 
or 5 people there ('Tr. p. 164). He made most of his 
visits in the evening around 9:00 o'clock (Tr. p. 165). 
8amuel L. Tedesco, a real estate salesman with 
Brockbank Realty Company, testified that he had been 
employed as manager of four beer parlors at one time 
in Salt Lake City, and that in his opinion any beer 
business should sell for about one year's profit (Tr. p. 
185). If there was no lease, it would not sell on the 
open market for that much (Tr. p. 188), in fact, it would 
be a risky purchase and he would not advise a client to 
buy on a month to month basis unless he got a very good 
buy (Tr. p. 191). 
Harold Leonard testified he was the President of 
the State Tavern Association and had been such for 
nine years; that he had also owned and operated a tavern 
where both bottled and draft beer were dispensed (Tr. 
p. 196) ; that in his · 9 years of experience he had visited 
taverns throughout the State and. seen their operations 
and knew what they sold for at different times (Tr. p. 
199); that he would not take into consideration any 
money derived from punch boards or pinball games in 
figuring the net profit of the business ( Tr. p. 200) ; that 
if there was no lease and the arrangement for the 
premises where it was operated was merely a month to 
month tenancy, he had no opinion as to the value of the 
business, as no one would want to purchase the same 
(Tr. p. 202); that in connection with the Horseshoe Inn, 
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the business 'vould have no value (Tr. p. 203). In his 
opinion, however, if the place had been 01perated for 
two months and a lease was available, then he would 
consider the good will worth about $1,000.00 (Tr. p. 206). 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON 
1. 'That the judgment and decree (Tr. p. 30) is 
contrary to law and is not supported by the evidence 
or by the Findings of Fact or by the Conclusions of Law. 
2. That the Conclusions of Law (Tr. p. 29) are not 
supported by the evidence or by the Findings of Fact. 
3. That Finding of Fact No. 3 (Tr. p. 29) is not 
supported by but is contrary to the law and the evi-
dence and, particularly, as the same purports to find that 
plaintiff and defendant did not on February 12, 1948 
have a complete settlement of accounts and that the 
operation of the Horseshoe Inn proved profitable. 
4. That Finding of Fact No. 4 (Tr. p. 29) is not 
supported by but is contrary to law and the evidence 
and, particularly, wherein it is found: 
"• * * Defendant wrongfully caused a cessation 
of the operations of the partnership on February 
12, 1948. That Defendant operated said "Horse-
shoe Inn" on and immediately afterFebruary 12, 
1948, and has continued to 01perate the same to 
the present time and to enjoy and profit by the 
value of the business and good will thereof which 
had been created and built up by the joint efforts 
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of the Plaintiff and the Defendant as partners, 
and that in addition to the aforesaid profits and 
inventory the partnership business as a profitable 
going business had other and additional value and 
such additional value was reasonably worth the 
sum of $1600.00 and of which the Defendant re-
tained the benefit thereof to himself and for which 
an accounting by the partners was not had and 
distribution not made ·of the same.'' 
5. The trial court erred in denying defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial (Tr. pp. 34, 38). 
6. That the amended compJaint does not state facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the 
defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
All of the assignments of error are considered in 
the different arguments, which we group as follows: 
1. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS 'TO STATE 
A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
From a reading of the complaint as a whole it is 
difficult to determine upon what theory plaintiff bases 
his right of recovery against the defendant. He alleges 
that on or about the first of November, 1947 they en-
tered into a partnership agreement and that the defend-
ant agreed to furnish the real property, building and 
fixtures. Plaintiff agreed to pay to the defandant $100.00 
per month during the term of the 'partnership. There is 
no allegation that the real property, building or fixtures 
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were to be any part or portion of the assets of the part-
nership. There is an allegation that by operating the 
business at the premises owned by defendant they would 
increase in Yalue, and that such increase would be con-
sidered as capital owned equally by the partners. It is 
further alleged that they agreed to enter into a written 
memorandum partnership agreement when convenient. 
There is no allegation that the partnership was to con-
tinue for any certain period of time. It is further alleged 
that they commenced business on the 13th of December, 
1947 and that the defendant terminated the partnership 
on the 12th day of February, 1948. The plaintiff alleges 
that subsequent to the 12th of February, 1948 he made 
demand of defendant for his share of the profits and for 
damages resulting to pJaintiff by reason of defendant's 
breach of the partnership agreement. In accordance 
with the allegations of the pleading defendant had a 
right to terminate the partnership at any time that he 
desired and not be subject to damages. 
Section 69-1-28 (1) (b) Utah Code Annotated 1943 
provides: 
''Dissolution is caused: 
(1) Without violation of the agreement be-
tween the partners : 
(b) By the express will of any partner 
when no definite term or particular under-
taking is specified. '' 
Under the pleadings there was no dissolution in 
contravention of the partnership agreement, therefore, 
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the plaintiff would not be entitled to damages by reason 
of the dissolution. 
Section 69-1-35 Utah Code Annotated 1943, reads in 
part as follows: 
"69-1-35. Rights of Partners to Application of 
Partnership Property. 
(1) When dissolution is caused in any way, 
except in contravention of the partnership agree-
ment, each partner, as against his copartners and 
all persons claiming through them in respect of 
their interests in the partnership, unless other-
wise agreed, may have the partnership property 
applied to discharge its liabilities, and the sur-
plus rupplied to pay in cash the net amount owing 
to the respective partners. But if dissolution is 
caused by expulsion of a partner, bona fide under 
the partnership agreement, and if the . expelled 
partner is discharged from all partnership liabili-
ties either by payment or agreement under sec-
tion 69-1-33 (2), he shall receive in cash only the 
net amount due him from the partnership. 
(2) When dissolution is caused in contra-
vention of the partnership agreement the rights 
of the partners shall be as follows: 
(a) Each 1partner who has not caused disso-
lution wrongfully shall have: 
1st All the rights specified in paragraph (1) 
of this section ; and, 
2nd The right as against each partner who 
has caused the dissolution wrongfully to damages 
for breach of the agreement.'' 
This would leave to plaintiff merely the right to 
have the partnersh]p property applied to the discharge 
of its liabilities and the surplus applied to pay in cash 
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the net amount owing to the respective parties. Plaintiff 
has admitted that he has received the profits earned by 
the business to and including the date of its termination, 
February 12, 1948, and he does not allege that there 
was any other property that should have been divided 
between the parties. He does endeavor to allege that by 
the two Inonths operation the parties enhanced the value 
of the premises of the defendant, created good will and 
a business reasonably worth $15,000.00. This allegation, 
we contend, is so uncertain and ambiguous that it does 
not amount to an allegation of fact upon which the com-
plaint can stand. There is no allegation that there was 
a lease of any duration at all upon the ~premises of the 
defendant or the equipment owned and furnished by the 
defendant. The allegations in paragraph 7 of the amend-
ed complaint are merely conclusions of the pleader. Th8 
other contention made by the plaintiff is that he is en-
titled to $500.00 for work in construction and remodeling 
the premises. Ther€ is no allegation, however, in the 
complaint that defendant agreed to pay said sum or 
even a reasonable sum for such services. In fact, there 
is no allegation that defendant ·even requested the plain-
tiff to do the work, and to have a cause of action there 
must be either a contract or an implied contract. 
2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PART-
NERSHIP AGREEMENT WAS BREACHED BY 
THE DEFENDANT. 
A partnership of no definite term may be dissolved 
by one partner unequivocally bringing notice home to 
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the other party that he no longer intends to be a partner. 
Gr,aham V'. Street, 109 Utah 460, 166 Pac. (2d) 524. 
Exhibit No. 3, which was admitted in evidence, was 
the proposed written partnership agreement which the 
plaintiff had prepared by his own attorney, has no pro-
vision in it that the partnership shall have any definite 
term. The only provision in that connection states: 
''SECOND: As hereinabove mentioned the part-
nership -commenced on the 13th day of December, 
1947, and shall continue until dissolved by the 
mutual and voluntary agreement of the parties 
or unless sooner dissolved by any act which is a 
cause for the dissolution of a partnership as pro-
vided under the terms or provisions of the Stat-
utes of the State of Utah, which said Statutes are 
commonly referred to as the Uniform Partner-
ship Act.'' 
On the question of the length of time the partnership 
was to remain in existence the plaintiff testified as 
follows: 
"Q. And you had your attorney, of course, em-
body in that agreement the understanding 
you understood was the partnership agree-
ment, didn't you T 
A. Well, it was supposed to be a partnership 
agreement, yes. 
Q. Well, I mean you had your attorney put in 
as you thought the plan that you and Mr. 
Ostoich-
A. No, sir, we just had it built up just as part-
nership agreement should be built up. 
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Q. Didn't you tell your attorney how long it 
was to exist for, and so forth and so on~ 
A. I told him just exactly what Mr. Ostoich told 
me." (Tr. p. 79). 
There is no question that the defendant unequi-
vocally gave notice to the plaintiff that he no longer 
intended to be a partner. The plaintiff testified that on 
or about the 12th day of February, 1948, when he went 
to pay defendant the $100.00 due each month defendant 
stated that he would no longer accept such payments, 
that they were through with the partnership and that 
plaintiff did not need to come down to open up the place 
but to come down and go over the books (Tr. pp. 71-72). 
There is no testimony that any act of the defendant 
caused the plaintiff to terminate the agreement, even his 
failure to sign the written partnership agreement was 
not the cause of the termination. 
3. THERE WAS A COMPLETE SETTLEMENT AND 
SATISFACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
As a logical incident to defendant's statement that 
the parties were through as partners and that he would 
no longer accept the payment of $100.00 a month, and 
that the plaintiff should only concern himself with the 
closing of the books, the parties prepared and signed the 
releases heretofore indicated and there was paid to the 
plaintiff by the defendant the sums representing accrued 
profits and inventory, all of which constituted as between 
the parties a full release and satisfaction. 
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4. THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS TO 
THE VALUE OF THE BUSINESS OR AS TO 
'THE VALUE OF THE GOOD WILL OF THE 
BUSINESS. 
As the court denied plaintiff's right to recover for 
the $500.00 plaintiff claimed for labor on repairing and 
altering the premises, the only other question that pos-
sibly could arise would be what property or assets of 
the partnership had not been divided, assuming for the 
pu}}pose of argument that the parties had not made a 
full and complete settlement between them. By the pre-
trial stipulation (Tr. p. 221) and Exhibits 1 and 2 plain-
tiff admitted that he had received one-half of the profits 
derived from the said business, and one-half of the value 
of the inventory of the stock in trade of the partnership 
as of the date of dissolution, February 12, 1948. What 
other assets would the partnership own or control~ Plain-
tiff admitted that the premises and building, furniture 
and equipment were owned and belonged to the defend-
ant and that the partnership had no interest therein by 
lease-right, title ·or otherwise (Tr. pp. 86, 139). This 
l~aves one other item and only one, that is the good will 
of the business and by good will we do not mean nor do 
we think it can be claimed that it is the value of the 
business as a going concern. The good will of a business 
is not the business but is one result springing out of it. 
McGowan v. Griffin, 69 Vt. 168, 37 Atl. 298. Good will 
exists as property merely as incident to other property 
rights and is not susceptible of being owned and disposed 
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of separately from the property right to which it is inci-
dent. Yost v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 S. (2d) 240. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case 
of Los Angeles Gas <f; Electric Corporation v. Railroad 
Commission of the State of California, 289 U. S. 287, 77 
L. Ed. 1180, points out the difference between the going 
value of a business and good will. The court states: 
''The going value thus recognized is not to be 
confused with good will, in the sense of that 'ele-
ment of value which inheres in the fixed and 
favorable consideration of customers, arising 
from an established and well-known and well-
conducted business,' which, as the Court has re-
peatedly said, is not to be considered in determin-
ing whether rates fixed for public service corpora-
tions are confiscatory.'' 
The witnesses testified as to the value of the business 
or the good will of the business, if their testimony can be 
construed to relate to the good will rather than to the 
business. Samuel L. Tedesco stated that it was a year's 
net earnings (Tr. p. 188), but he also testified that if 
there was no lease and it was a month to month rental 
which could be stopped at any time within thirty days 
notice that it would be entirely urp to the man who wanted 
to risk the purchase of the business ( Tr. p. 189). Harold 
Leonard stated that if there was no lease there would 
be no value (Tr. pp. 203-204). The reasoning behind this 
tPstimony is clearly pointed out in the decision of Justice 
Cardozo in the case of ReAccounting of Grace Q. Brown 
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et al., 242 N.Y. 1, 150 N.E. 581, 44 A.L.R. 510, where the 
court set out the elements of good will: 
''Assuming for 'present purposes that the dis-
position of good will has not been varied by agree-
ment, we reach the question whether there was 
any good will to be dis1posed of upon the facts 
recited in the findings. To answer that question, 
we must consider at the outset what rights would 
have passed to a buyer of the good will if the 
surviving partners had sold it in the course of 
liquidation. ·The chief elements of value upon 
any sale of a good will are, first, continuity of 
place; and, second, continuity of name. People 
ex rei. A. J. Johnson Co. v. Roberts, 159 N. Y. 70, 
at page 83, 45 L.R.A. 126, 53 N .E. 685. There 
may, indeed, at times be others, e.g., continuity 
of organization. That element is of value in busi-
ness of a complex order. Where the business is 
simple, the benefits of organization are slight and 
not so easily transmitted. Confining ourselves 
now to the two chief elements of value, we may 
assume that the buyer of this good will would 
have been reasonably assured of continuity of 
place. The firm offices were the same from the 
beginning of the business till the death of Stephen 
Brown and later. There is nothing to show that 
the survivors, genuinely endeavoring to dispose 
of the good will, would have been unable to deliver 
possession to a buyer of the lease.'' 
In the case at bar there is no right of continuity of 
location and there was no sale. Mr. and Mrs. Ostoich 
owned the premises and lived in the rear thereof so that 
in order to give any value to the location Mr. and Mrs. 
Ostoich would have had to be willing to sell the premises 
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and move their living quarters. This fact was known to 
the plaintiff at the time he went into the partnership. 
He knew there was no lease going to the partnership and 
that at any time the defendant could have required the 
removal of the business from the location. With these 
facts in mind, it is clear that there could have been no 
contemplation of good will being created as an asset that 
might be sold or disposed of. 
The only other evidence introduced to support pJain-
tiff's case went to the amount of beer sold, the net vrofits 
made each month during the two months of the partner-
ship's existence. Part of this evidence was based on the 
income derived from the operation of pinball machines 
and punch boards, which Leonard testified should not be 
considered in determining the worth of the business ( Tr. 
p. 200). 
5. THE COURT'S FINDING NUMBER 4 IS SO IN-
DEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN THAT IT 
AMOUNTS TO NO FINDING AT ALL. 
In Finding number 4 the court states: 
'' * * * and that in addition to the aforesaid profits 
and inventory the partnership business as a 
profitable going business had other and additional 
value and such additional value was reasonably 
worth the sum of $1600.00 and of which the De-
fendant retained the benefit thereof to himself 
and for which an accounting by the partners was 
not had and distribution not made of the same.'' 
(Tr. 1p. 29). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
There is no finding pointing out any other property 
owned by the partnership that was not divided between 
the parties. What the court intended to find as having 
other additional value as a going business is not dis-
closed. Did the court intend to find that had the partner-
ship continued there would have been a value of $1600.00, 
or did it intend to find that if defendant had been willing 
to sell the premises and fixtures that over and above 
their value a purchaser would have paid $1600.00, or 
was it good will that the court had in mind~ Even if one 
could determine what 1property the court had in mind, 
where in the record is there any evidence to substantiate 
the figure of $1600.00~ But one conclusion can be reached 
-the court decided plaintiff should recover something 
and, in order to dispose of the case, merely took an arbi-
trary figure and said, Mr. Defendant, that's what you owe. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment appealed from should be reversed and 
the case remanded with such instructions or findings as 
to this court seems proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN & RICHARDS 
BRENT T. LYNCH, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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